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Cross-currents in French Defense and U.S. Interests
Executive Summary
France is the only European ally-except for the United Kingdom (UK)-that regards its military capabilities, operational performance, and defense industry as vital levers to exert global influence. While the French believe strongly in their need to preserve "strategic independence, " they see new challenges in the evolving international security environment that will oblige them to accept greater cooperation with others, even in areas once considered too sensitive to discuss.
Although some French strategists remain uncomfortable with the notion of closer defense ties with the United States, others ask whether there might be a greater danger ahead: specifically, if
Europe's strength dissipates as America "rebalances" toward the Asia-Pacific region, where does France turn to find capable and willing partners to protect its security interests?
The Libyan conflict in 2011 brought to light many of the cross-currents that are shap- 3 ■ ■ Upheavals in the Arab world-which, the study acknowledges, were a "strategic surprise"-will take years to play out and will permanently alter regional balances. The
Mediterranean region, part of the "arc of crisis" identified by the White Book, is now "at the heart of [French] strategic interests. " 4 ■ ■ The continuing international financial and economic turbulence, including European sovereign debt problems, "constitute a radically new element" that accelerates the progressive shift of the "strategic center of gravity" toward Asia, especially China and India. France remains "a favorite target" for such groups, who might seek to mount a major attack in Europe involving nonconventional weapons. 7 The interministerial study does not propose specific modifications to existing defense policy and capabilities. It suggests, however, that the new White Book (to be prepared by the next government in late 2012) will need to address tensions among France's level of ambition, budgetary resources, and ability to work with others on terms acceptable to Paris. The study asserts, for example, that "maintaining strategic independence remains a key issue for France, " but later states that French policy must evolve toward greater multilateral cooperation, including within
European frameworks and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military structures. 8 Determining the right balance between independence and cooperation will not be an easy task. Indeed, many French experts worry that their country will be unable to maintain its global rank in the coming years absent significantly expanded defense cooperation with other Europeans and, in some areas, with the United States. However, the somber economic outlook for the European Union (EU)-where cumulative gross domestic product (GDP) is predicted to shrink by 0.5 percent in 2012, in contrast with a predicted 6 percent growth in the Brazilian, Russian, Indian, and Chinese economies-has fueled increasing French pessimism regarding European defense efforts as well. 9 Moreover, while some French strategists remain uncomfortable with the notion of closer defense ties with the United States, since they traditionally have looked to reduce the U.S. influence over European security affairs, others ask whether there might be a greater danger ahead: specifically, if Europe's strength dissipates as America "rebalances" toward the Asia-Pacific region, where does France turn to find capable and willing partners to protect its security interests? 10 Hence, French defense leaders must navigate amid a number of strong cross-currents.
There is little doubt anymore that their country must turn toward greater cooperation with others, even in areas formerly considered too sensitive to discuss. But for the French, finding the right mix of partners and areas of cooperation has become a much more complicated affair than they anticipated just a few years ago.
French Defense Capabilities: Major Trends
When Nicolas Sarkozy unveiled the White Book, few experts were predicting the finan- were not among the top "bomb droppers" during the early stages of the campaign, according to NATO experts, they rose to become a leader in this category during the last 2 months of Operation Unified Protector.
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) For French armament officials, the operation confirmed the technical capabilities and reliability of their strike, sensor, and helicopter protection systems. 25 Moreover, several well-placed French experts believe their forces generally outperformed the British in terms of operational flexibility, effectiveness, and-particularly in helicopter attacks-willingness to take risks to engage Libyan targets. 26 French officers are particularly proud that their government was willing-and able-to conduct the first strike of the campaign on March 19, which was aimed at stopping Qadhafi's forces outside rebel-held Benghazi without coordinating with their British (or American) coalition partners; for that attack, French forces could operate "autonomously, " using their national airborne warning and control aircraft, aerial refuelers, and strike aircraft. As one senior French officer commented, "Before Libya, we always measured ourselves against the British. Libya, to our surprise, showed that we are ahead of them in many ways. "
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On the other hand, the Libyan operation underscored French and, more broadly, European reliance on U.S. strike assets (including cruise missiles and specialized aircraft), "enablers" And some French officials concede that despite its shortcomings, the NATO command structure proved an adaptable "skeleton" that Allies can reinforce relatively quickly with specialized capabilities. They cite, as an example, the rapid influx of American (with some British and French) intelligence and targeting specialists to a NATO installation outside Naples, Italy, to handle the complex demands of continuous air operations.
In Search of Capable and Reliable European Partners
Even before the Libyan conflict, French officials and nongovernmental experts were concerned about the political will of many fellow Europeans to join in military missions that might fall short of collective defense but are nonetheless important to French national interests. Libya, however, confirmed France's need to take a hard look at its current and potential future defense partnerships in Europe. And in some cases, the post-Libya fallout is already apparent.
Doubts About Germany
Since the early 1950s, French and German governments across the political spectrum have put the advancement of their bilateral relations-in economic, political and, since the 1980s, defense affairs-near or at the top of their international priorities. In turn, the Franco-German "locomotive" within the European Union frequently has led-or pushed-fellow Europeans to accept expanded integration and cooperation, including the development of CSDP. Over the past 2 years, Paris and Berlin have worked especially closely together (despite some underlying policy differences) to contain the sovereign debt crisis threatening the Eurozone. Indeed, French politicians and commentators by and large acknowledge Germany's leadership role in Europe regarding financial and economic matters, although they disagree strongly over whether the "German model" should be applied in France.
In important defense-related areas, however, French doubts about German policies and sought language in NATO documents that, from Paris's perspective, would diminish the role of nuclear deterrence in Alliance strategy, advocate NATO's adoption of "negative security assurances," encourage the early withdrawal of U.S. nonstrategic nuclear weapons from Europe, and possibly put pressure on France to join future multilateral nuclear arms negotiations. 30 A broad consensus within the French strategic community opposes such moves, fearing they eventually would put significant pressure on France to change its nuclear doctrine and reduce its independent nuclear forces below the levels needed for credible deterrence. While French officials and nongovernmental experts broadly agree on the nature of their concerns regarding Germany as a partner in defense matters, they differ on how seriously these will affect the overall relationship between the two countries. For some respected retired French officers, Germany's accumulated experience in out-of-area operations since the early 1990s already has begun to transform German "military culture" and wean its political class from its heavy focus on territorial defense. In their view, once Germany's ongoing defense restructuring efforts and professionalization of the military are further advanced, the bilateral "locomotive" seen in economic, financial, and political affairs will extend to the defense sector as well.
Other French experts, inside and outside government, are decidedly pessimistic. They foresee a continuing trend, particularly among younger Germans, toward "pacifist" and "anti-nuclear" sentiments. Some see a large and growing disconnect between French security priorities in the Mediterranean region and, as one French interlocutor put it, Germany's "preoccupation with Mittel Europa. " 33 For these experts, this France must look elsewhere for its strongest partnerships on in the defense area, while compartmentalizing its divergences with Germany to avoid harming the overall relationship.
CSDP in "Hibernation"
The EU goal, according to the White Book, should be to have the capability to "simultaneously conduct, over an extended period, two to three peacekeeping or peace enforcement op- In the past few years, however, several factors have improved the prospects for meaningful and sustained French-British defense cooperation. Despite past recriminations over Iraq, French and British policymakers and analysts have come to share similar assessments of the international security environment, especially regarding weapons and ballistic missile proliferation, terrorism, and threats to free access in the global commons (cyber, maritime, and space).
The two countries have many overlapping interests in the Persian Gulf, Southwest Asia, subSaharan Africa, and Balkans.
Regarding capabilities, French and British armed forces are similar in many respects, although French land forces are about 15 percent larger. Both countries have-and want to maintain-"full spectrum" military capabilities, including nuclear and conventional components.
According to their respective security strategies, both want to be able to deploy and sustainalone, if necessary-highly capable "intervention" forces of approximately 30,000 personnel, with aviation and maritime support. 44 Although the overall British defense budget is somewhat larger (due in part to higher personnel expenditures), their investment and research levels are fairly close. Together, the two countries account for nearly half of Europe's total defense spending and about two-thirds of its research and development effort. 
Impact of French Elections
Defense issues traditionally have not been at the forefront of French presidential election
campaigns. This year's race, which is dominated by economic, employment, and societal issues (such as immigration policy), is no exception. Unlike Sarkozy, Hollande publicly has hinted at future defense cuts, noting that "there are savings to be made, " although he has not offered specific examples. 61 He has pledged to keep overall defense spending constant relative to total public sector spending; hence, in principle, defense (which now represents around 3.3 percent of that total) would not suffer disproportionately if deficit cutting measures were necessary. Moreover, according to one defense advisor, Hollande's pursuit of growth-oriented policies (combined with much higher taxes on the wealthy) would ease pressure on all government spending, including the defense budget.
However, if those policies were to fail and a new round of austerity were unavoidable, there is little doubt that Hollande's government would be more inclined than Sarkozy's to protect social budgets important to the French Left.
The United States and "la Grande Nation" 
Defense Industry Issues
While the United States and France cooperate closely on many strategic and operational issues, their interactions on defense industrial matters often have been strained and, at times, confrontational. Contributing factors include direct competition between U.S. and French industrial concerns (particularly in the aerospace industry) for sales to third parties and, in some cases, to each other's military; related disputes over the extent of government subsidies provided to those industrial concerns; and differences over arms export policies and practices, especially where technology transfer issues are involved.
Moreover, where controversies arise, they can be exacerbated by the mismatch of interests.
As seen from Paris, the U.S. defense industry casts a huge shadow over the potential market for
French products, with all that that implies for their domestic employment and, in some cases, 
Trilateral Cooperation
The deepening British-French defense relationship is fully consistent with key U.S. strategic priorities, including the promotion of enhanced capacity, interoperability, and political will among American allies and partners to share the costs and responsibilities of global leadership. As demonstrated during the 2011 Libyan crisis, once Washington, London, and Paris agree on their strategic goals, their militaries need to be capable of acting effectively and on short notice, either as a "coalition of the willing" or within a NATO framework. All three will want to preserve that capability, even as the United States proceeds to "rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region. " 64 Moreover, given the certainty of continuing tight constraints on defense spending (if not further reductions) on both sides of the Atlantic, trilateral cooperation will become more important to preserve core capabilities and competencies within the Alliance as a whole. This would be especially true if, as some European experts predict, the "Afghanistan effect" were to make many Allies even more disinclined to involve themselves in expeditionary operations. inter alia, cooperation on nuclear weapons design, development, and maintenance. Noting that France also cooperates "very closely" with the United States on nuclear weapons issues, Fox acknowledged that "there has been discussion for some time about whether the [nuclear] relationship should be trilateral, given the cost of the programmes, but the decision has been taken that for the moment, the double bilateral relationship will continue. " 67 In principle, a U.S.-British-French trilateral relationship could take many forms, including but not limited to intensified information-sharing on the nuclear capabilities of states outside the trilateral group, high-level political-military discussions of nuclear targeting and employment doctrine, shared access to submarine maintenance facilities, and coordination of ballistic missile submarine deployment schedules and/or areas. However, as a recent study correctly notes, "Cooperation between the three would be an intriguing response to an uncertain strategic environment, in a political climate in which the role of nuclear weapons is once more a matter for debate . . .
[but] one can imagine any number of political, legal and technical obstacles, as well perhaps as a British reluctance to make the transatlantic relationship less 'special. '" 68 French authorities also will tread carefully where nuclear matters are concerned. A broad and deep consensus exists in the French political class, defense establishment, and strategic affairs community on core tenets of nuclear policy: the credibility of the French deterrent rests on the president's ability to decide "independently" whether and how to use it in defense of the nation's "vital interests"; France will maintain the minimal level of nuclear forces consistent with its security needs, but its force level will not depend on that of other nuclear powers; and a credible deterrent can only be assured if France maintains, on a national basis, the specialized technological and industrial competencies necessary to build and maintain its nuclear forces.
Finding a path to advance France's bilateral or, eventually, trilateral nuclear cooperation with the United Kingdom and the United States without putting into question one or more of these core tenets will not be easy. According to some French experts, however, there might not be a pressing need to make any quick decisions on this score. In their analysis, thanks to the extensive modernization programs executed over the past decade, the government has another 7 to 10 years to decide on its next round of major force recapitalization efforts. This would give the French time to consider whether and, if so, how to link their forces more closely to those of the British.
Still, this leaves open the possibility of a French initiative in the nuclear policy area, which some experts hope will be considered in the post-election preparations of a new White Book.
When France returned to NATO military structures in 2009, it did not join the Nuclear Planning Group and its subordinate bodies, where the 27 other defense ministers and their senior representatives meet at regular intervals to discuss a range of nuclear policy matters-from the safety, security, and survivability of nuclear weapons to wider issues such as nuclear arms control and nuclear proliferation.
But leading figures within the French strategic community are now suggesting that France reconsider its position and become a full participant in NATO nuclear policy discussions (perhaps under a renamed and reconfigured committee 
A Cautionary Note
The French, at times, can be difficult partners for the United States and other Europeans For the United States, more is at stake than the health of the French defense establishment.
France's policies, capabilities, and operational commitments can play an important role in shaping those of many other Europeans. By working even more closely with its oldest ally, the United
States can help ensure the credibility and effectiveness of the Alliance as a whole.
